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Pity Abraham Lincoln. Everything that should have gone right for the Union cause in the spring of 1864 had,
in just a few weeks, gone defiantly and disastrously wrong.
For two years, the 16th president had toiled uphill against the secession of the Confederate states, against the
incompetence of his luckless generals and against his howling critics from both sides of the congressional aisle.
Finally, in the summer and fall of 1863, the course of the war had begun to turn his way. Two great victories at
Gettysburg and Vicksburg staggered the Confederates, and those were followed by a knockdown blow
delivered at Chattanooga by the man who was fast becoming Lincoln’s favorite general, Ulysses S. Grant. “The
signs look better,” Lincoln rejoiced, “Peace does not appear so distant as it did.” [excerpt]
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A Union artillery battery at Cold Harbor.Credit Library of Congress 
Pity Abraham Lincoln. Everything that should have gone right for the Union cause in the spring of 
1864 had, in just a few weeks, gone defiantly and disastrously wrong. 
For two years, the 16th president had toiled uphill against the secession of the Confederate states, 
against the incompetence of his luckless generals and against his howling critics from both sides of 
the congressional aisle. Finally, in the summer and fall of 1863, the course of the war had begun to 
turn his way. Two great victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg staggered the Confederates, and those 
were followed by a knockdown blow delivered at Chattanooga by the man who was fast becoming 
Lincoln’s favorite general, Ulysses S. Grant. “The signs look better,” Lincoln rejoiced, “Peace does not 
appear so distant as it did.” 
Peace was not the only thing that would be brought closer by victory. The presidential election of 1864 
was looming, and if Lincoln had any desire for a second term, a victorious end to the war was the 
surest way to secure it. He had never seriously considered taking what appeared to some people as an 
obvious shortcut to remaining in office – declaring the war to be a national emergency and 
suspending elections for the duration, though two Union governors, in Indiana and Illinois, had done 
what amounted to that on the state level. That only made the need for military victory all the more 
urgent, and so Lincoln installed Grant as general in chief of all the Union armies in March 1864, and 
Grant obliged him with a comprehensive strategic plan that united Union assaults in Georgia, 
Alabama and, under his own direct command, in Virginia. 
None of it worked, and the place where it seemed to work the least was under Grant’s own nose. 
Crossing the Rapidan River on May 4, 1864, Grant’s army entered at once into a series of head-to-
head contests with Robert E. Lee’s fabled Army of Northern Virginia. Fighting three pitched battles – 
at the Wilderness, Spotsylvania Court House and the North Anna River – and enduring numerous 
smaller collisions, Grant worked his way down toward the Confederate capital at Richmond, which he 
got within 10 miles of by the end of the month. But the fighting had cost a colossal total of 40,000 
dead, wounded and missing, and Lincoln gloomily understood that the Northern public “hold me 
responsible.” 
They weren’t the only ones. Radicals within Lincoln’s own Republican Party in Congress had long 
been convinced that Lincoln’s preference for a soft postwar Reconstruction was dis-heartening the 
Republican base. They were further angered when the Republican national committee, headed by 
Lincoln’s ally Edwin D. Morgan, met in late February 1864 and announced that the party would hold 
its presidential nominating convention in Baltimore in June, not as “Republicans,” but as the 
“National Union Convention.” As Grant’s campaign in Virginia ground agonizingly forward, the most 
vehement of the Radicals – led by Frederick Douglass, Wendell Phillips and Horace Greeley – staged 
a protest convention in Cleveland’s Cosmopolitan Hall, and on June 4 nominated the Radical darling, 
John Charles Fremont. 
If ever there was a moment when Lincoln needed good news from the battlefield, it was now, and 
Grant wanted to deliver it. The staggering blows he had dealt the rebels convinced him a little too 
easily that the Confederates were “really whipped,” that “our men feel they have gained morale over 
the enemy and attack with confidence,” and that with one more blow, “success over Lee’s army is 
already assured.” On June 1, Grant launched a hasty strike at Cold Harbor, before the bulk of his army 
could get into action. Even so, the attack cracked the Confederate defenses on the Cold Harbor road 
and forced them to fall back. With another good push, Grant might just be able “crush Lee’s army on 
the north side of the James, with the prospect in case of success of driving him into Richmond, 
capturing the city perhaps without a siege, and putting the Confederate government to flight” – not to 
mention providing a rousing military endorsement for Lincoln’s renomination. 
But Grant, in his eagerness, had badly misread the Confederates, and when he launched a full-dress 
attack at Cold Harbor on June 3, it resembled (as one Confederate general put it) “not war but 
murder.” Well-prepared Confederate infantrymen mowed down federal at-tackers. Grant’s army 
sustained 3,500 casualties in the main attack and another 2,500 in related actions that day, and the 
armies settled into a miserable standoff. 
Yet Grant carefully limited his report of the Cold Harbor debacle to four terse sentences, including the 
claim that “our loss was not severe.” And in the official report of the campaign he filed after the war, 
Cold Harbor consumed just three sentences in 51 pages. For years afterward, Grant’s doubters 
wondered whether he had deliberately soft-pedaled the failure at Cold Harbor in order to limit 
political damage to Lincoln on the eve of the Baltimore convention. There is no direct evidence of such 
collusion; still, Grant’s dismissal of his losses as “not severe” is peculiar. 
Even more peculiar, newspaper reporting from the field was shut down by the War Department 
because of “a violent storm.” The New York Times (whose editor, Henry Raymond, was the new 
chairman of the National Union Party’s national Committee) did not publish an ac-count of the June 
3 attack for three more days, and even then, merely observed that “losses were inconsiderable.” 
Strangest of all, however, was Grant’s refusal to propose a truce to recover the wounded from the 
battlefield until June 7. Military tradition dictated that only the loser of an engagement asked for such 
a truce. Even though there could not have been much debate about who had won and who had lost at 
Cold Harbor, Grant delayed the truce agreement (and any public admission of defeat) for four days, 
while men suffered and died from thirst, blood loss and exposure. 
By June 7, however, any anxiety that bad news from Cold Harbor would endanger Lincoln’s 
nomination was past. That same day, the Union National Convention opened at the Front Street 
Theater in Baltimore, with Robert J. Breckinridge asking triumphantly, “Does any one doubt that this 
convention intends to say that Abraham Lincoln shall be the nominee?” They did not, and the next 
day, undisturbed by any news of Cold Harbor, Lincoln – described by one state delegation as “the 
second savior of the world” – was unanimously renominated by the convention. 
Given how diligently the National Union Party’s staff had worked to ensure Lincoln’s renomination in 
the months before the Baltimore assembly, even the freshest news from Cold Harbor might not have 
made much difference. But keeping the ill wind at bay certainly did not hurt. Nor was it uncommon in 
this war for the impact of bad military news to be blunted by creative hesitation. One of Grant’s corps 
commanders was overheard telling a staffer not to report actual casualty figures: “It will never do, 
Locke, to make a showing of such heavy losses.” After that, wrote the officer who overheard him, “I 
always doubted reports of casualties.” It irked one Philadelphia newspaper on June 9 to admit that 
“we can scarcely find out that there was fought one of the bloodiest battles of the war, yet, until 
yesterday, no one knew its result.” This was, in the end, a highly political war, in which military 
decisions frequently turned before the winds of politics. And in the coming months, Lincoln would 
find far greater political challenges in the path of re-election than the ones presented by Cold Harbor. 
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